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RESPONDING TO BIOTERRORISM: AN 
ANALYSIS OF TITLES I AND II OF THE PUBLIC 
HEALTH SECURITY AND BIOTERRORISM 
PREPAREDNESS AND RESPONSE ACT OF 2002 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The anthrax attacks of 2001 showed Americans that our government 
was ill-prepared to handle the challenges associated with preparing for and 
responding to a major act of bioterrorism. The locus of some of those 
attacks—congressional office buildings in Washington, D.C.—also made 
lawmakers keenly aware of these inadequacies.1 Thus, introduced in the 
immediate wake of the attacks and signed into law six short months later, 
the Public Health Security and Bioterrorism Preparedness and Response 
Act of 2002 promised to be a major tool in the federal government’s fight 
against bioterrorism.2 However, like many bills passed in the wake of 
September 11th, the major provisions of the Bioterrorism Preparedness 
and Response Act are in need of critical analysis.3 This Note seeks to 
review Title I and Title II of the Act as they address federal preparedness 
and response capabilities. 
Part II of this Note provides an overview of the problems associated 
with bioterrorism by first focusing on the past and present threats from a 
bioterrorism attack and then turning to the state of the federal government 
response capabilities prior to the anthrax events of 2001. In doing so, it 
brings to light the structural and bureaucratic obstacles the federal 
government faced in trying to respond to the anthrax attacks and provides 
 1. Robert Pear, House Passes Measure Tightening Toxin Controls, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 26, 2001, 
at B9. 
 2. See Committee News Release, The Committee on Energy and Commerce, Tauzin Hails 
Conference Agreement on Landmark Bioterrorism Bill (May 21, 2002), available at 
http://energycommerce.house.gov/107/News/05212002_575print.htm. 
 3. For examples of post-September 11, 2001 congressional action, see Terrorism Risk Insurance 
Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-297, 116 Stat. 2322 (2002); Homeland Security Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 
107-296, 116 Stat. 2135 (2002); Maritime Transportation Security Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-295, 
116 Stat. 2064 (2002); Terrorist Bombings Convention Implementation Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-
197, 116 Stat. 721 (2002); Mychal Judge Police and Fire Chaplains Public Safety Officers’ Benefit Act 
of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-196, 116 Stat. 719 (2002); Public Health Security and Bioterrorism 
Preparedness and Response Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-188, 116 Stat. 594 (2002); Enhanced Border 
Security and Visa Entry Reform Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-173, 116 Stat. 543 (2002); Victims of 
Terrorism Tax Relief Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-134, 115 Stat. 2427 (2002); USA PATRIOT ACT 
of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-56, 115 Stat. 272 (2001); Air Transportation Safety and System Stabilization 
Act, Pub. L. No. 107-42, 115 Stat. 230 (2001). 
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a glimpse of the political climate which resulted in the passage of the 
Public Health Security and Bioterrorism Preparedness and Response Act 
of 2002. Part III analyzes the provisions of the Act aimed at addressing the 
major problems in coordinating the federal response to bioterrorism, 
namely, the lack of statutory authority addressing the bioterrorism threat, 
fragmentation in agency responsibilities, inadequacy in the federal 
response infrastructure, and the lack of restrictions on the possession and 
use of dangerous pathogens. Part IV then briefly proposes some additional 
changes to the federal government’s response structure that are aimed at 
addressing problems not fully considered by the Act. Finally, Part V 
concludes that the Act is an encouraging first step in the federal 
government’s fight against bioterrorism, but many coordination and 
structural problems must be addressed in order to fully prepare against 
future threats. 
II. BACKGROUND/OVERVIEW 
A. The Problem: Bioterrorism 
1. Historical Perspective 
The use of biological agents as a means to invoke fear and inflict 
destruction dates back to at least 1346 when soldiers loaded victims of 
bubonic plague into catapults to launch over city walls.4 By World War I, 
after the establishment of the germ theory, the German Army utilized 
biological agents in an attempt to infect Allied horses and troops.5 By the 
1940s and the outbreak of World War II, the United States, Japan, and the 
Soviet Union all counted biological agents as major parts of their arsenal 
of offensive weapons.6
While the U.S. military developed major offensive biological-weapon 
programs after World War II,7 little attention was paid to the threat of 
bioterrorism at home until the 1980s and then was not taken seriously until 
 4. Robert E. Armstrong & Jerry B. Warner, Biology in the Battlefield, DEFENSE HORIZONS, 
Apr. 2003, at 1. These actions were taken by Tartar soldiers in the besieged Black Sea Port of Kaffa 
and some medical historians believe that this act was responsible for the Black Death (bubonic plague) 
that ravaged Europe in the 14th century. Id. 
 5. Id. This German operation may also be one of first uses of biological weapons against 
domestic U.S. interests as the program was carried out by German agents in the U.S. who tried 
(unsuccessfully) to infect the horses before they were shipped to Europe. Id. 
 6. Id.  
 7. American Gulf War Veterans Association, History of Biological Warfare, at 
http://www.gulfwarvets.com/biowar.htm (last visited Jan. 31, 2005). 
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the Japanese Aum Shinrikyo cult failed ten times in the early 1990s to 
release anthrax and botulinum toxin in central Tokyo.8 After these events 
and the tragic circumstances of the Oklahoma City bombing in 1995, 
federal officials finally began to consider the possibility of a bioterrorism 
attack on U.S. soil.9
2. The Anthrax Attacks of 2001 
In early September of 2001, the General Accounting Office (“GAO”) 
stated in a report on federal preparedness for a bioterrorism event that “the 
probability of a domestic bioterrorist attack has been considered to be 
low,” and “the possibility that terrorists may use chemical or biological 
materials may increase over the next decade.”10 However, just days later 
three members of press organizations in the New York area, two United 
States Postal employees in New Jersey, and an employee of American 
Media Inc. in Florida all reported to hospitals after coming into contact 
with anthrax spores sent via the mail.11 On October 15, 2001, an employee 
of former Senator Tom Daschle opened a letter containing anthrax in one 
of the Senate office buildings; soon after, postal workers in both the 
District of Columbia and New Jersey reported symptoms of anthrax 
exposure.12 From the beginning of October 2001 until the end of 
 8. Armstrong & Warner, supra note 4, at 2. In 1984, Indian guru Bagwan Shree Rajeesh and his 
followers contaminated salad bars with salmonella in a rural part of Oregon causing 750 cases of food 
poisoning and sending forty-five people to the hospital. Id. In 1995, the Japanese Aum Shinrikyo cult 
used sarin gas to kill twelve people and injure 5,000 in the Tokyo subway system. Id. However, what 
shocked U.S. authorities was the discovery that the cult had built a biological weapon facility at its 
Naganohara headquarters. Global Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction: Hearing Before the 
Permanent Subcomm. on Investigations of the Sen. Gov’t Affairs Comm., 104th Cong. 63 (1995) (Staff 
Statement: Global Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction: A Case Study on the Aum 
Shrinikyo). Even more surprising to U.S. officials was that the group had designed and tested 
biological toxins using computer software sold directly to the cult by companies in Oregon and 
Missouri. Id. at 78–79. 
 9. See generally RICHARD A. FALKENRATH ET AL., AMERICA’S ACHILLES’ HEEL (1998); see 
infra notes 90–97 (discussing the rise of the Federal Response Plan and Presidential Decision 
Directive 39, which was adopted after the Oklahoma City Bombing in 1995). For a more complete 
history of the law and bioterrorism, see VICTORIA SUTTON, LAW AND BIOTERRORISM 3–9 (2003) 
[hereinafter SUTTON, LAW AND BIOTERRORISM]. 
 10. GEN. ACCT. OFF., GAO-01-915, BIOTERRORISM: FEDERAL RESEARCH AND PREPAREDNESS 
ACTIVITIES 5 (2001) [hereinafter FEDERAL RESEARCH AND PREPAREDNESS ACTIVITIES]. 
 11. GEN. ACCT. OFF., GAO-04-152, BIOTERRORISM: PUBLIC HEALTH RESPONSE TO ANTHRAX 
INCIDENTS OF 2001, at 34 (2003) [hereinafter RESPONSE TO ANTHRAX INCIDENTS OF 2001]. The first 
cases of cutaneous anthrax consisted of two NBC employees, a New York Post employee, the child of 
an ABC employee, and two postal employees from New Jersey. Id. The afflicted Florida employee 
was the first reported inhalational anthrax case and was also the first casualty on October 5, 2001. Id. 
All of these cases resulted from letters filled with anthrax spores in powder form. Id. 
 12. Id. 
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November, a total of twenty-two people were infected with anthrax in five 
states and the District of Columbia.13 Five of those twenty-two died from 
the attacks.14 This major domestic bioterrorism attack tested the public 
trust in the federal government’s response capabilities15 and highlighted 
the weaknesses in coordination, planning, and public health readiness for 
biological attacks.16
3. Future Threats 
The anthrax attacks of 2001 forced the federal government to 
reevaluate the seriousness and imminence of a biological attack launched 
by terrorists.17 The attacks also created a need for greater research and 
public education on the types of biological agents that might be used in an 
attack18 and the countermeasures, such as vaccines, that would be vital in 
any type of response.19  
 13. Id. at 34–36. 
 14. Id. at 1. Of the twenty-two people infected, eleven had cutaneous anthrax and eleven came 
down with the inhalation form. Id. All five deaths were caused by inhalational form, id., which has a 
fatality rate of approximately 75% compared to the 25%–60% fatality rate for cutaneous anthrax. Id. at 
6. 
 15. See Charles Ornstein, A Faltering Confidence in the Call for Calm, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 31, 
2001, at A3 (quoting Helen Schauffler, executive director of the Center for Health and Public Policy 
Studies at UC Berkeley as saying “[t]he ineptitude of the response of our officials to this is 
unbelievable, . . . [t]hey keep giving these false reassurances, and all it's doing is undermining their 
credibility.”). 
 16. RESPONSE TO ANTHRAX INCIDENTS OF 2001, supra note 11, at 2 (“The response to the 
incidents has been characterized by several public officials, academics, and other commentators as 
problematic and an indication that the country was unprepared for a bioterrorist event.”); Lawrence K. 
Altman & Gina Kolata, Anthrax Missteps Offer Guide To Fight Next Bioterror Battle, N.Y. TIMES, 
Jan. 6, 2002, at A1 (chronicling the failures of the government’s response to the attacks and quoting 
experts as stating that the government failed to understand “the difference between the goals of 
terrorism and the goals of warfare”). 
 17. The flurry of legislation, agency reports, and the statements of government officials 
addressing the need for increasing the federal government’s preparedness best indicates this point. See 
supra note 3. 
 18. The Centers for Disease Control now offers fact sheets and extensive information on at least 
twenty-seven biological agents that could be used in a bioterrorism event. See Centers for Disease 
Control and Prevention, CDC Emergency Preparedness & Response: Bioterrorism Agents/Diseases, at 
http://www.bt.cdc.gov/agent/agentlist.asp (last modified Nov. 19, 2004). The CDC lists six organisms 
as “Category A agents,” which are defined as those that “are believed to pose the greatest potential 
threat for adverse public health impact and have a moderate to high potential for large-scale 
dissemination.” Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, Frequently Asked Questions About 
Smallpox, at http://www.bt.cdc.gov/agent/smallpox/disease/faq.asp (last modified Dec. 29, 2004). The 
six “Category A agents” are: (1) Smallpox (Variola major) is widely thought to be eradicated 
worldwide, but it is one of the most feared agents that could be used as a weapon because it is 
virulently contagious and can be fatal in 30% of cases. Id. (2) Anthrax (Bacillus anthracis) is not 
contagious, but the spores can survive in soil for years and the inhalation form of the resulting disease 
is usually fatal. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, Questions and Answers About Anthrax: 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol83/iss1/6
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B. Federal Government Preparedness and Response 
Preparing for and responding to a bioterrorism event necessarily 
involves a wide array of local, state, and federal government agencies.20 
Local governments provide many of the “first responders” in an attack and 
control much of the health infrastructure that is needed for addressing the 
release of a biological agent.21 States have traditionally regulated all 
Frequently Asked Questions, at http://www.bt.cdc.gov/agent/anthrax/faq/index.asp (last modified Jan. 
28, 2005). (3) Plague (Yersinia pestis), 
used in an aerosol attack could cause cases of the pneumonic form of plague. . . . Once people 
have the disease, the bacteria can spread to others who have close contact with them. Because 
[there is a] delay between being exposed to the bacteria and becoming sick, people could 
travel over a large area before becoming contagious and possibly infecting others. . . . A 
bioweapon carrying Y. pestis is possible because the bacterium occurs in nature and could be 
isolated and grown in quantity in a laboratory. 
Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, Frequently Asked Questions (FAQ) About Plague, at 
http://www.bt.cdc.gov/agent/plague/faq.asp (last reviewed Jul. 27, 2004). (4) Botulism (Clostridium 
botulinum) is a bacterium that produces a fatal nerve toxin and is a major threat to food supplies. 
Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, Facts About Botulism, at http://www.bt.cdc.gov/agent/ 
botulism/faq/index.asp (last modified Oct. 14, 2001). (5) Tularemia (Francisella tularensis) “is highly 
infectious . . . [and a] small number of bacteria (10–50 organisms) can cause disease. If Francisella 
tularensis were used as a bioweapon, the bacteria would likely be made airborne so they could be 
inhaled. People who inhale the bacteria can experience severe respiratory illness, including life-
threatening pneumonia and systemic infection.” Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, 
Frequently Asked Questions (FAQ) About Tularemia, at http://www.bt.cdc.gov/agent/tularemia/ 
faq.asp (last modified Oct. 8, 2003). (6) Viral Hemorrhagic Fevers, such as Ebola, hantavirus and the 
Marburg virus, are highly infectious and have no known treatment or established cure. However, they 
are hard to handle safely, which makes them difficult for terrorist use. Council on Foreign Relations, 
Others Biological Agents: Botulism, Plague, Tularemia, HFVs, at http://cfrterrorism.org/weapons/ 
otheragents_print.html (last visited Mar. 1, 2005). 
 19. See Bioterrorism and Proposals to Combat Bioterrorism: Hearing Before the House Comm. 
on Energy and Commerce, 107th Cong. 54 (2001) (testimony of Hon. Tommy Thompson, Secretary, 
Department of Health and Human Services) (“The President and the Department [of Health and 
Human Services] are . . . committed to the development and the approval of new vaccines and 
therapies [to combat bioterrorism].”). 
 20. GEN. ACCT. OFF., GAO-03-654T, INFECTIOUS DISEASE OUTBREAKS: BIOTERRORISM 
PREPAREDNESS EFFORTS HAVE IMPROVED PUBLIC HEALTH RESPONSE CAPACITY, BUT GAPS REMAIN 
3–4 (2003) (prepared testimony of Janet Heinrich, GAO Director of Health Care-Public Health Issues, 
before the House Committee on Government Reform) [hereinafter INFECTIOUS DISEASE OUTBREAKS]. 
 21. Id. “Local health care organizations, including hospitals, are generally responsible for the 
initial response to a public health emergency . . . [H]ospitals and their emergency departments would 
be on the front line, and their personnel would take on the role of first responders.” Id. at 3. “The 
burden of responding to [a bioterrorism] attack would fall initially on personnel in state and local 
emergency response agencies. These ‘first responders’ include firefighters, emergency medical service 
personnel, law enforcement officers, public health officials health care workers (including doctors, 
nurses, and other medical professionals), and public works personnel.” GEN. ACCT. OFF., GAO-02-
141T, BIOTERRORISM: PUBLIC HEALTH AND MEDICAL PREPAREDNESS 2 (2001) [hereinafter PUBLIC 
HEALTH AND MEDICAL PREPAREDNESS] (prepared testimony of Janet Heinrich, GAO Director of 
Health Care-Public Health Issues, before the Subcommittee on Public Health of the Senate Committee 
on Health, Education, Labor, and Pensions). 
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aspects of the public health system pursuant to their police powers,22 and 
the federal government has the authority to act to protect public health 
under the auspices of national security.23 However, this multi-layered 
structure has the potential to create conflicts that could hamper efforts to 
address the threats of bioterrorism.24 Thus, some experts have suggested 
that the federal government should have the chief role in responding to 
bioterrorism.25  
 22. Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11 (1905) (The protection and preservation of the public 
health is among the most important duties of state government); Compagnie Francaise de Navigation a 
Vapeur v. State Board of Health, 186 U.S. 380, 387 (1902) (holding that a state can promulgate 
quarantine laws “for the purpose of preventing, eradicating, or controlling the spread of contagious or 
infectious diseases”); James G. Hodge, Jr., Bioterrorism Law and Policy: Critical Choices in Public 
Health, 30 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 254, 256 (2002) [hereinafter Hodge, Salient Issues in Public Health 
Law] (discussing the broad powers of the state governments to protect the health, safety and general 
welfare under their traditional police powers); Victoria Sutton, Bioterrorism Preparation and 
Response Legislation—The Struggle to Protect States’ Sovereignty While Preserving National 
Security, 6 GEO. PUB. POL’Y REV. 93, 94 (2001) [hereinafter Sutton, Struggle to Protect States’ 
Sovereignty] (“The regulation of public health has traditionally been a police power of the states, 
arising from the regulation of contagion and disease in colonial times.”).  
 One of the most important developments in state bioterrorism law has been the adoption of parts 
of the Model State Emergency Health Powers Act (MSEHPA) by 32 states. MODEL STATE 
EMERGENCY HEALTH POWERS ACT (Dec. 2001), available at http://www.publichealthlaw.net/ 
MSEHPA/MSEHPA2.pdf. MSEHPA clearly defines the powers of state health officials during a 
bioterrorism attack and provides a comprehensive framework for state quarantines of individuals. Id. 
States have used the MSEHPA to supplement their existing public health laws and clarify state 
responsibilities in the face of a bioterrorism attack. Lawrence O. Gostin & James G. Hodge, Jr., Public 
Health Emergencies & Legal Reform: Implications for Public Health Policy and Practice, PUB. 
HEALTH REP., Sept.–Oct. 2003, available at http://www.publichealthreports.org/userfiles/118_5/ 
118477.pdf. However, few states have implemented the entire MSEHPA and have instead adopted 
their own changes as a gloss to existing state public health law. Id. Missouri presents an example of 
this typical state structure as scattered sections of the Missouri Statutes were recently amended to 
address bioterrorism. See MO. REV. STAT. § 44.010 (Supp. 2003) (the Civil Defense Chapter was 
amended to include the word “bioterrorism” in the state’s emergency response framework); id. 
§ 21.800 (establishing the Joint Committee on Terrorism, Bioterrorism, and Homeland Security to 
revise Missouri statutes to address the threat of a bioterrorism attack). 
 23. Sutton, Struggle to Protect States’ Sovereignty, supra note 22, at 94 (stating that national 
security is controlled by the federal government, but noting that this usually has meant dealing in the 
international arena). 
 24. Id. at 93. “The coordination of traditional emergency response mechanisms . . . are those 
which are clearly defined and practiced. However, the coordination for peacetime preparations for 
bioterrorist action is not so clearly defined and remains a vulnerable position for the United States.” Id. 
 25. Id. at 102; see also Hodge, Salient Issues in Public Health Law, supra note 22, at 258 
(discussing six reasons why state and local authorities should defer to the federal government; briefly 
they are: (1) greater financial capability, (2) greater bargaining power to buy vaccines and drugs, (3) 
the migratory nature of a biological agent across state lines, (4) better ability to develop institutional 
expertise, (5) national security implications of bioterrorism, and (6) the federal government’s ability to 
coordinate intelligence and law enforcement). 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol83/iss1/6
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1. Agency Roles 
While the federal government may be in the best position to respond to 
a bioterrorist attack because of its vast resources, this broad range of 
capabilities also gives rise to fragmentation among federal agencies in 
response planning.26 This fragmentation necessarily results from the lack 
of a centralized or coherent statutory or regulatory framework addressing 
the threat posed by a bioterrorist attack.27 Thus, federal agencies with 
relevant responsibilities are forced to coordinate with each other formally 
(formal agreements), informally (working groups and partnerships), or 
simply develop their own independent plan for responding to an attack.28 
As a pre-anthrax-attack GAO report explained, “different agencies are 
responsible for various coordination functions, which limits accountability 
and hinders unity of effort.”29 Thus, a review of the roles played by 
relevant federal agencies before the anthrax attacks of 2001 gives us an 
idea of the landscape prior to congressional action.30
a. Department of Health and Human Services 
The Department of Health and Human Services (“DHHS”) is the lead 
federal agency in managing public health responses to terrorist events and 
other emergencies.31 Under the Public Health Services Act,32 the Secretary 
of DHHS has broad statutory powers to respond to a public health crisis 
and is authorized to develop and take such actions as necessary to 
implement a plan to control infectious diseases.33 In addition, the Act 
 26. PUBLIC HEALTH AND MEDICAL PREPAREDNESS, supra note 21, at 1 (“more than 20 federal 
departments and agencies [have] a role in preparing for or responding to the public health and medical 
consequences of a bioterrorist attack.”).  
 27. Jason W. Sapsin, Introduction to Emergency Public Health Law for Bioterrorism 
Preparedness and Response, 9 WIDENER L. SYMP. J. 387, 395 n.49 (2003) (describing the federal law 
related to a public health response as “sprawling”). 
 28. FEDERAL RESEARCH AND PREPAREDNESS ACTIVITIES, supra note 10, at 4. 
 29. Id. 
 30. By “relevant” agencies I mean those affected by the provisions of the Public Health Security 
and Bioterrorism Preparedness Act (the topic of this Note). “Congressional Action” refers to the 
legislative activity undertaken by the 107th Congress in the months subsequent to the anthrax 
attacks—culminating in the passage of the Public Health Security and Bioterrorism Preparedness Act 
and the Homeland Security Act in 2002. For an exhaustive review of the federal agencies involved in 
responding to a bioterrorism event, see Victoria Sutton, Biodefense: Who’s in Charge?, 13 HEALTH 
MATRIX 117, 121–48 (2003). 
 31. FEDERAL RESEARCH AND PREPAREDNESS ACTIVITIES, supra note 10, at 48; FED. 
EMERGENCY MGMT. AGENCY, NO. 9230.1-PL, INTERIM FEDERAL RESPONSE PLAN 16 (2003) 
[hereinafter INTERIM FEDERAL RESPONSE PLAN]. 
 32. Public Health Services Act, 42 U.S.C. § 201 (2000). 
 33. 42 U.S.C. § 243 (2000). 
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authorizes DHHS to provide assistance to a state or local governments, 
upon request, to respond to a health emergency that is “of such a nature as 
to warrant Federal assistance.”34 However, the most sweeping powers 
given to DHHS are those that allow the Secretary to promulgate rules to 
establish federal quarantines in an effort to prevent the spread of cholera, 
diphtheria, tuberculosis, plague, smallpox, yellow fever, viral hemorrhagic 
fevers, and SARS.35 Federal law also allows the Secretary broad authority 
in times of war to apprehend and detain persons who are infected with a 
biological agent, are contagious, and pose a threat of infecting any 
member of the armed forces.36  
The Secretary is authorized to develop (and may take such action as may be necessary to 
implement) a plan under which personnel, equipment, medical supplies, and other resources 
of the [Public Health] Service and other agencies under the jurisdiction of the Secretary may 
be effectively used to control epidemics of any disease or condition and to meet other health 
emergencies or problems. 
Id. § 243(c)(1). 
 34. Id. § 243(c)(2). “The Secretary may, at the request of the appropriate State or local authority, 
extend temporary (not in excess of six months) assistance to States or localities in meeting health 
emergencies of such a nature as to warrant Federal assistance.” Id. The statute is unclear as to exactly 
what emergency would “warrant Federal assistance,” but DHHS regulations provide some guidance at 
42 C.F.R. § 70.2. 
 35. 42 U.S.C. § 264(a): 
 The Surgeon General, with the approval of the Secretary, is authorized to make and 
enforce such regulations as in his judgment are necessary to prevent the introduction, 
transmission, or spread of communicable diseases from foreign countries into the States or 
possessions, or from one State or possession into any other State or possession. 
Id. Exec. Order No. 13,295, 68 Fed. Reg. 17,255 (Apr. 9, 2003) (adding Severe Acute Respiratory 
Syndrome (SARS) to the list of communicable diseases for which the Secretary can order a 
quarantine); 42 C.F.R. §§ 70.5, 70.6 (2002) (DHHS regulations authorizing the Secretary to implement 
and enforce a quarantine). 42 U.S.C. § 264(d) provides for the actual detention of infected individuals: 
[R]egulations prescribed under this section may provide for the apprehension and 
examination of any individual reasonably believed to be infected with a communicable 
disease in a communicable stage and (1) to be moving or about to move from a State to 
another State; or (2) to be a probable source of infection to individuals who, while infected 
with such disease in a communicable stage, will be moving from a State to another State. 
Such regulations may provide that if upon examination any such individual is found to be 
infected, he may be detained for such time and in such manner as may be reasonably 
necessary. 
Id. Note that this is the pre-2002 version of § 264(d). The subsection was significantly amended by the 
Public Health Security and Bioterrorism Preparedness and Response Act of 2002. For a thorough 
discussion of quarantine powers and the many legal issues raised by their implementation, see Michael 
Greenberger, The Law of Counterterrorism Wants You!, 35 MD. B.J. 10, 12–13 (Dec. 2002); Lorena 
Matei, Note, Quarantine Revision and the Model State Emergency Health Powers Act: “Laws for the 
Common Good,” 18 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH L.J. 433 (2002); and for a discussion on 
what role the military might play in quarantine enforcement, see Richard H. Kohn, Using the Military 
at Home: Yesterday, Today, and Tomorrow, 4 CHI. J. INT’L L. 165 (2003). 
 36. 42 U.S.C. § 266 (2000). 
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This broad statutory grant of powers made DHHS the logical choice for 
centralizing bioterrorism preparedness and response capabilities, but the 
agency itself is not structured to perform this function.37 Instead, DHHS 
contains five federal agencies that work on differing bioterrorism issues.38 
Of these five, the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (“CDC”) 
and the Office of Emergency Preparedness (“OEP”) play the greatest role 
in preparation for, and response to, a bioterrorism attack, while the Food 
and Drug Administration (“FDA”) and others focus mainly on research.39
b. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention 
In 1998, the CDC began specifically addressing the public health 
threats of a bioterrorism event by creating the “Bioterrorism Preparedness 
and Response Program” under the direction of DHHS.40 The purposes of 
this program were to enhance public health capacity at all levels of 
government, develop a national pharmaceutical stockpile, and study 
aspects of a bioterrorism event.41 The National Center for Infectious 
Diseases administers the program and oversees research efforts on 
biological agents, health surveillance activities, and epidemiological 
response actions.42  
 37. See infra notes 38–39 and accompanying text. 
 38. FEDERAL RESEARCH AND PREPAREDNESS ACTIVITIES, supra note 10, at 48. The five 
agencies are: (1) the Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality (AHRQ), (2) the Food and Drug 
Administration (FDA), (3) The National Institutes of Health (NIH), (4) the Centers for Disease Control 
and Prevention (CDC), and (5) the Office of Emergency Preparedness (OEP). Id. This diffuse 
arrangement of bioterrorism activities within a single agency fosters the same fragmentation that has 
the potential to hinder the collective response of all federal agencies to a bioterrorism event. See 
RESPONSE TO ANTHRAX INCIDENTS OF 2001, supra note 11, at 40 (DHHS comments on GAO report 
indicating that DHHS’s role in responding to anthrax attacks should not be downplayed in light of the 
CDC’s efforts; “The [GAO] could enhance the utility of the report by making explicit that the CDC 
role, invaluable as it was, is only part of the story.” (emphasis added)). 
 39. FEDERAL RESEARCH AND PREPAREDNESS ACTIVITIES, supra note 10, at 54–59. THE AHRQ, 
the FDA, and the NIH are mostly involved in the research end of bioterrorism, while the CDC and the 
OEP focus on preparedness and response capabilities. Id. However, with the passage of the 
Bioterrorism Response Act the FDA assumed new duties in protecting the nation’s food supply. See 
Public Health Security and Bioterrorism Preparedness and Response Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-
188, §§ 301–36, 116 Stat. 594 (2002). 
 40. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, Programs in Brief: Bioterrorism and Public 
Health Preparedness, at http://www.cdc.gov/programs/bt.htm (last reviewed June 23, 2004). Although 
created in 1998, the first time this program was put into effect was the onset of the anthrax attacks of 
2001. Id. 
 41. FEDERAL RESEARCH AND PREPAREDNESS ACTIVITIES, supra note 10, at 49 (noting that as of 
fiscal year 2001 the program had focused on assisting states with emergency planning, enhancing 
laboratory capacity and disease surveillance at all levels of government, and improving 
communications and training for responders).  
 42. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, National Center For Infectious Diseases: About 
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In 1999, the CDC was charged with creating the National 
Pharmaceutical Stockpile (“NPS”)43 “to provide a re-supply of large 
quantities of essential medical material to states and communities during 
an emergency within twelve hours of the federal decision to deploy.”44 
These “12-hour push packs” contain antidotes, antibiotics, and other life-
saving materials, and are stored in secure warehouses in non-disclosed 
strategic locations.45 The decision to deploy the assets of the NPS starts 
with a state governor’s office directly seeking the release of the push packs 
from the CDC.46 The CDC then decides the appropriate course of action 
after consulting with other federal officials.47 Finally, the NPS is bolstered 
by the Vendor Managed Inventory System (“VMI”), which provides 
additional medical supplies, pharmaceuticals, and medical equipment 
within twenty-four to thirty-six hours after the vendors are notified of a 
need.48
Also in the summer of 1999, the CDC launched the Laboratory 
Response Network (“LRN”) in response to Presidential Decision Directive 
39.49 The LRN is a multi-level system designed to link first-responder labs 
the Center, at http://www.cdc.gov/ncidod/about.htm (last reviewed Nov. 10, 2003). 
 43. The National Pharmaceutical Stockpile Program became the Strategic National Stockpile 
(SNS) with the passage of the Bioterrorism Response Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-188, § 121, 116 
Stat. 594, 611-613 (2002). In addition, the Homeland Security Act of 2002 transferred the power to set 
goals for the stockpile and manage actual distribution from the CDC to the Department of Homeland 
Security, Pub. L. No. 107-296, § 503(b), 116 Stat. 2135, 2213 (2002). 
 44. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, The Strategic National Stockpile, at 
http://www.bt.cdc.gov/stockpile/index.asp (last modified Feb. 10, 2005) [hereinafter The Strategic 
National Stockpile] (discussing the “mission” of the SNS as mandated by Congress and DHHS). 
 45. Id. The “12-hour push packs” are designed to be deployed to any location in the continental 
United States within twelve hours of the decision to activate the NPS. Id. The CDC also deploys a 
team of experts with the push packs called the Technical Advisory Response Unit (TARU) that escorts 
the packs to the site and provides aid to state and local officials in distributing and maximizing the 
supplies. Id. The first time the CDC deployed push packs was on September 11, 2001. Association of 
State & Territorial Health officials (Kristine Maxymiv), National Pharmaceutical Stockpile Program 
Responds to Terrorist Attacks and Florida Anthrax Cases, at http://www.astho.org/templates/ 
display_pub.php?pub_id=655 (last visited Mar. 1, 2005). The agency delivered fifty tons of medical 
supplies to New York City just seven hours after the World Trade Center Towers collapsed. Id. 
 46. The Strategic National Stockpile, supra note 44. 
 47. Before passage of the Homeland Security Act, the Director of the CDC was in charge of this 
decision; however, after the establishment of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), the CDC 
must now share this decision-making authority with the DHS. Id. 
 48. Preventing and Responding to Bioterrorism Threats: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on 
Health of the House Comm. on Veterans Affairs, 107th Cong. (2002), available at http://www.cdc.gov/ 
washington/testimony/bt041002.htm (testimony of Dr. Kevin Yeskey, M.D., Director of CDC’s 
Bioterrorism Preparedness and Response Program) (noting that the VMI is a part of “NPS[‘s] . . . two-
tier response.”). However, if the biological agent is well-defined, CDC may use VMI as its first choice 
because it would be able to request specific pharmaceuticals instead of sending the pre-made push-
packs. The Strategic National Stockpile, supra note 44. 
 49. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, Summary on the Laboratory Response Network, 
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in hospitals and other local institutions with state public health and crime 
labs and major federal laboratories, including the CDC, Department of 
Defense, and Department of Agriculture.50 One central and continuing 
problem in addressing a bioterrorism event is providing local responders 
with enough information about the agent so they can choose the 
appropriate response plan.51 The LRN is an attempt to solve this problem 
by providing local “sentinel” labs with a direct link to core federal 
“reference” laboratories so specimens can be accurately and quickly 
identified by the foremost public health experts.52 Like many other CDC 
response systems, the LRN’s first real test came during the anthrax attacks 
of 2001 when the network tested between 125,000 and 150,000 clinical 
specimens and environmental samples for Bacillus anthracis.53  
Due to the need for a multi-government and multi-agency response to a 
bioterrorism event, communication capacity is one of the most important 
aspects of the CDC’s response role.54 To meet the challenge of 
disseminating and receiving information from a vast number of local and 
state agencies, the CDC developed the Health Alert Network (“HAN”).55 
The network consists of high-speed internet connections for state and local 
officials that are dedicated to the transfer of health alerts, disease data, 
(Apr. 17, 2002), at http://www.cdc.gov/cic/functions-specs/function4Docs/nLRNvision-summary.doc 
[hereinafter Summary on the LRN]; see Presidential Decision Directive 39, infra note 91. 
 50. Summary on the LRN, supra note 49. Hospitals typically have clinical microbiology labs that 
do not have the capacity or the ability to handle dangerous pathogens, thus, the LRN gives them secure 
access to larger state and metropolitan labs that have the ability to identify specific agents used in a 
bioterrorism event. Id. These labs are then supported by the major federal agencies with laboratory 
capability, including the Department of Energy’s Lawerence Livermore National Laboratory, the 
National Institutes for Health’s Office of Research Services, the Department of Justice’s FBI crime 
labs, and the EPA’s Office of Research and Development. Id.  
 51. RESPONSE TO ANTHRAX INCIDENTS OF 2001, supra note 11, at 15–16 (describing how 
hospitals in the epicenters of the anthrax attacks needed immediate information on how to identify 
inhalational anthrax so doctors could initiate the proper treatment). 
 52. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, Facts About the Laboratory Response Network, 
at http://www.bt.cdc.gov/lrn/factsheet.asp (last modified Aug. 11, 2004). There are about 25,000 
“sentinel” laboratories in the LRN that monitor the local population, initially handle a biological agent 
and ensure that it is sent to the proper “reference” laboratory. Id. There are 120 “reference” labs in the 
LRN that house the most advanced technology in handling deadly pathogens and perform the “rule-
out, rule-in” analysis needed in agent identification; this includes the CDC’s own Rapid Response and 
Advanced Technology Laboratory. Id. 
 53. Summary on the LRN, supra note 49; see supra note 18 for a brief discussion of agents that 
could be used in a bioterrorist attack. 
 54. RESPONSE TO ANTHRAX INCIDENTS OF 2001, supra note 11, at 24–25 (discussing the CDC’s 
concurrent roles of leading the public health response and collecting and analyzing data to 
communicate specific guidance information to local responders, the media, and the public). 
 55. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, Public Health Practice Program Office: Health 
Alert Network Fact Sheet, at http://www.phppo.cdc.gov/han/FactSheet.asp (last reviewed Jan. 23, 
2002). 
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treatment guidelines, and the secure transmittal of disease surveillance and 
other sensitive data.56 The CDC relied on the HAN during the anthrax 
attacks to distribute guidance to local officials assessing the threat of 
inhalation anthrax via the mail.57 However, the system was only 
marginally effective as many local jurisdictions received incomplete 
data.58  
c. Office of Emergency Preparedness59
The OEP is primarily responsible for two major programmatic 
initiatives for preparedness, the National Disaster Medical System 
(“NDMS”) and the Metropolitan Medical Response System (“MMRS”).60 
The NDMS is a public-private partnership of medical providers that 
strives to ensure the availability of adequate medical personnel and 
resources during any event that overwhelms local health care systems.61 
The NDMS primarily accomplishes this goal via the organization and 
deployment of Disaster Medical Assistance Teams (“DMATs”).62 DMATs 
are made up of groups of thirty-five health professionals who are able to 
deploy to the scene of a disaster with enough supplies to sustain 
 56. Id. 
 57. RESPONSE TO ANTHRAX INCIDENTS OF 2001, supra note 11, at 25. The HAN played a vital 
role in disseminating new information during the attacks. Id. After the first cases were discovered, the 
CDC did not believe there was a risk of contracting inhalational anthrax from a sealed letter, therefore 
the CDC did not recommend antibiotic treatment for those individuals exposed only to sealed letters. 
Id. However, after a postal worker in Washington, D.C. contracted inhalational anthrax after exposure 
to a sealed envelope containing anthrax spores, the CDC was able to immediately amend its guidance 
using HAN. Id. 
 58. Id. All of the state health departments were connected to HAN during the attacks, but only 
thirteen of those states had similar connections to their local health departments. Id. Thus, CDC’s 
guidance did not reach many local areas, and many of the areas that did receive the messages only 
received some of the necessary information. Id. at 25–26. 
 59. The OEP has since been renamed the “Office of Emergency Response,” within the Office of 
the Assistant Secretary for Public Health Emergency Preparedness (OASPHEP) (created under DHHS 
by the Public Health Security and Bioterrorism Preparedness and Response Act of 2002). 67 Fed. Reg. 
48,903 (July 26, 2002). However, the Homeland Security Act of 2002 moved the OASPHEP under the 
Department of Homeland Security. See Homeland Security Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-296, §§ 501, 
503(5), 116 Stat. 2135 (2002). 
 60. FEDERAL RESEARCH AND PREPAREDNESS ACTIVITIES, supra note 10, at 63–66. The 
Homeland Security Act moved both the NDMS and the MMRS under the Department of Homeland 
Security. See § 502, 116 Stat. at 2135. 
 61. FEDERAL RESEARCH AND PREPAREDNESS ACTIVITIES, supra note 10, at 63–65. The other 
federal agencies involved in this partnership are: DHHS, Department of Defense, Department of 
Veterans Affairs, and the Federal Emergency Management Agency. Id. at 63. “The overall purpose of 
the system is to establish a single, integrated national medical response capability to (1) assist state and 
local authorities . . . with the . . . health effects of major peacetime disasters and (2) . . . support . . . the 
military and VA medical systems in caring for casualties.” Id. 
 62. Id. at 64–65. 
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themselves for seventy-two hours of providing medical care in temporary 
facilities.63 In addition, the NDMS contains four National Medical 
Response Teams (“NMRTs”) that specialize in caring for victims of a 
weapon of mass destruction.64 Three of these teams are deployable 
anywhere in the United States with enough medical supplies and 
pharmaceuticals to treat 5,000 people.65 However, the GAO indicated in a 
2001 report that most of their supplies focused on preparedness for a 
chemical attack.66 In the wake of the September 11th attacks, several 
DMATs were deployed to the World Trade Center site and to the 
Pentagon to provide immediate assistance.67
The MMRS began in 1996 and is basically a contractual arrangement 
between the OEP and local governments to develop and coordinate local 
medical response in disaster situations.68 This system functions to help 
first responders coordinate their activities in the period before federal 
resources can be mobilized.69 Unlike the NDMS, the focus of the MMRS 
is specifically tailored to help local communities cope with the use of a 
weapon of mass destruction.70  
2. Prior Congressional Action 
In the years before the threat of a bioterrorism attack morphed into 
reality in the fall of 2001, Congress acted on several pieces of legislation 
to address terrorism preparedness.71 While Congress did not pass a bill 
 63. PHS-1 Disaster Medical Assistance Team, Public Health Service Disaster Medical 
Assistance Team (PHS-1 DMAT) website: NDMS and DMAT, at http://teams.fema.gov/dmat/about/ 
ndms.html (last visited Feb. 27, 2005). DMATs can also specialize in a particular service like burn 
care, mental health, or Disaster Mortuary Operational Response Teams (DMORTs) that provide victim 
identification and mortuary services. FEDERAL RESEARCH AND PREPAREDNESS ACTIVITIES, supra note 
10, at 64. 
 64. FEDERAL RESEARCH AND PREPAREDNESS ACTIVITIES, supra note 10, at 64. 
 65. Id. 
 66. “[T]hese stockpiles are primarily for treating victims of a chemical weapon.” Id. 
 67. Id. at 64 n.5 (noting that the initial DMAT units included more than 300 medical and 
mortuary personnel). For a detailed chronology of one DMAT deployment to the World Trade Center 
site following the September 11th attacks, see PHS-1 Disaster Medical Assistance Team, History of 
NY WTC Deployment, at http://teams.fema.gov/dmat/news/events/WTC/history.htm (last visited Feb. 
27, 2005). 
 68. FEDERAL RESEARCH AND PREPAREDNESS ACTIVITIES, supra note 10, at 65 (noting that, as of 
2001, OEP had contracted with ninety-seven local areas to develop response capabilities). 
 69. The Metropolitan Medical Response System, About MMRS, at http://mmrs.fema.gov/Main/ 
About.aspx (last visited Feb. 27, 2005) (noting that the system is designed to coordinate “first 
response” personnel planning in the first forty-eight hours of a public health crisis).  
 70. See id. 
 71. See Counter-Terrorism Training and Resources for Law Enforcement, Legislation, at 
http://www.counterterrorismtraining.gov/leg/index.html (last visited Nov. 14, 2003) (providing a 
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specifically dealing with bioterrorism, several bills dealt with the issue 
under provisions for domestic preparedness.72 Congress included one of 
the most important bioterrorism preparedness provisions in the 
Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (“AEDPA”).73 
Section 511 of the AEDPA achieved two very important things: (1) it 
made it a crime to attempt to obtain biological agents that could be used as 
weapons74 and (2) it authorized the regulation of biological agents that 
“pose a severe threat to public health and safety.”75 One of the motivating 
forces behind passage of the AEDPA was an incident where an individual 
surreptitiously attempted to mail-order strains of plague from a biological 
agent supply company.76 Federal officials apprehended the individual, but 
had no legal means to charge him with a crime other than mail fraud.77 
Thus, the AEDPA amended the U.S. Criminal Code to make any attempt, 
threat, or conspiracy to attempt or threaten to obtain any biological agent 
for “use as a weapon” a crime punishable by up to life in prison.78  
To further address this glaring loophole in federal law, the AEDPA 
ordered the Secretary of DHHS to compile a list of all biological agents 
that have “the potential to pose a severe threat to public health and safety”; 
comprehensive list of current and past legislation affecting counter-terrorism strategies and efforts); 
Library of Congress THOMAS Legislative Information Network, Legislation Related to the Attack of 
September 11, 2001, at http://thomas.loc.gov/home/terrorleg.htm (last visited Nov. 14, 2003) 
(providing a list of all terrorism-related legislation introduced in the wake of September 11th through 
the conclusion of the 107th Congress). 
 72. For example, Congress included the Defense Against Weapons of Mass Destruction Act (also 
referred to as the Nunn-Lugar-Domenici Amendments) in the National Defense Authorization Act for 
fiscal year 1997. See National Defense Authorization Act for FY 1997, Pub. L. No. 104-201, 110 Stat. 
2422 (1996). Title XIV, Subtitle A “Domestic Preparedness” of the Defense Authorization Act 
authorized the Department of Defense to undertake measures to coordinate and assist civilian response 
to a biological or chemical attack. Id. These provisions eventually led to the formation of the MMRS 
under the OEP and greatly enhanced the capabilities and cooperation of first responders after an attack. 
See supra notes 68–69. 
 73. Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1214 
(1996). 
 74. § 511(b), 110 Stat. at 1284 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 262). 
 75. § 511(d)-(f), 110 Stat. at 1284-85 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 262). 
 76. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, Backgrounder, The Select Agent Rule (Dec. 9, 
2002), at http://www.cdc.gov/od/oc/media/pressrel/b021210.htm [hereinafter The Select Agent Rule]. 
 77. Id.  
 78. § 511(b), 110 Stat. at 1284 (amending 18 U.S.C. § 175(a)) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 262). The 
current version of 18 U.S.C. § 175(a) states: 
Whoever knowingly develops, produces, stockpiles, transfers, acquires, retains, or possesses 
any biological agent, toxin, or delivery system for use as a weapon, or knowingly assists a 
foreign state or any organization to do so, or attempts, threatens, or conspires to do the same, 
shall be fined under this title or imprisoned for life or any term of years, or both. 
18 U.S.C. § 175(a) (2000). 
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promulgate regulations to ensure the safe transfer of harmful agents; and 
establish guidelines for laboratory facilities so as to prohibit unauthorized 
access by terrorists and criminals.79 In response, the Secretary of DHHS 
turned to the CDC for the promulgation of a final rule.80 The CDC 
developed a list of thirty-eight “select agents”81 that posed a significant 
risk to the public and concurrently established a registration program for 
laboratories that wished to transfer them.82 The final rule provided that 
commercial suppliers, government agencies, universities, and private 
companies had to register with the CDC before they could transfer any of 
the select agents and certify that their lab had sufficient safety measures in 
place to handle the pathogen.83 The rule also required that a “responsible 
facility official” must verify the contents of each shipment so the CDC 
could more effectively track each pathogen and notify federal law 
enforcement if discrepancies occurred.84 The rule enforced these 
provisions by providing for federal criminal and civil penalties for 
individuals that refused to comply.85 However, while this rule allowed the 
CDC to track agents that were sent between registered facilities, it 
provided no means of accounting for possible bioterrorism agents that 
were stored in labs across the country.86 In addition, the CDC’s reluctance 
to force regulation on their peers in the scientific community—combined 
with the agency’s concerns about the rule’s possible impact on research 
capabilities—left enforcement in question.87  
 79. § 511(d)-(f), 110 Stat. at 1284 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 262).  
 80. The Select Agent Rule, supra note 76; see also 61 Fed. Reg. 29,327 (June 10, 1996) (notice of 
proposed rule entitled “Additional Requirements for Facilities Transferring or Receiving Select 
Infectious Agents”).  
 81. Select Agent “means a microorganism (virus, bacterium, fungus, rickettsia) or toxin . . . 
includ[ing]: Genetically modified microorganisms or genetic elements from organisms” and organisms 
containing genetic material from a select agent. 42 C.F.R. § 72.6(j) (2004). 
 82. 42 C.F.R. § 72.6. “This final rule and associated criminal penalties apply only to interstate 
and intrastate transfer of these agents. Possession of these agents is outside the scope of this final 
rule.” 61 Fed. Reg. 55,194 (Oct. 24, 1996) (emphasis supplied); Centers for Disease Control and 
Prevention, Select Agent Program, available at http://www.cdc.gov/od/sap (last reviewed Mar. 1, 
2005). 
 83. 42 C.F.R. § 72.6(a)-(c).  
 84. Id. § 72.6(e)(1) (“Prior to transferring any agent covered by this part, the transferor’s 
responsible facility official must verify with the requestor’s responsible facility official, and as 
appropriate, with the registering entity: (i) That the requesting facility retains a valid, current 
registration; [and] (ii) That the requestor is an employee of the requesting facility.”).  
 85. Id. § 72.7 (stating that an individual that makes a “false, fictitious, or fraudulent statement or 
representation on . . . forms required in the part for registration of facilities or for transfers of select 
agents” is subject to a fine and five years in jail). 
 86. See 42 C.F.R. § 72.6(a)-(c) (note the absence of requirements for possession of select agents). 
 87. The Threat of Bioterrorism in America: Assessing the Adequacy of Federal Law Relating to 
Dangerous Biological Agents: Hearing Before the Subcomm. On Oversight and Investigations of the 
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3. Response Planning 
The Federal Response Plan is the key document for the implementation 
of federal government resources in the event of a terrorist attack.88 
Originally drafted by the Federal Emergency Management Agency in 
1992 under the Stafford Act,89 it defines the responsibilities of the twenty-
seven federal agencies involved in responding to a major disaster.90 In 
1995, President Clinton further refined the plan’s focus on terrorism 
response by issuing Presidential Decision Directive 39 (“PDD-39”).91 The 
most significant aspect of this Directive was the clear designation of 
Federal Lead Agency (“FLA”) responsibilities to the Department of 
Justice (“DOJ”) in responding to an attack involving weapons of mass 
destruction.92 As outlined in PDD-39, the DOJ’s responsibility, as 
delegated to the FBI, is to act as the FLA for “Crisis Management” under 
the Federal Response Plan and it can choose to involve only those federal 
agencies it deems necessary to provide assistance or guidance in 
responding.93 PDD-39 places the Federal Emergency Management 
House Comm. On Commerce, 106th Cong. 25-27 (1999) (prepared statement of Stephen M. Ostroff, 
M.D., Associate Dir. Of Epidemiologic Science, Nat’l Center for Infectious Diseases, Centers for 
Disease Control). 
CDC has worked extensively with our partners in the scientific community to develop and 
implement the regulation, even though we believe the regulatory framework has adversely 
impacted the longstanding working relationships with some of these partners. 
 . . . . 
 . . . We believe it is critical for safeguards to be carefully balanced against other 
important societal concerns, notably the need to support and encourage legitimate and 
important research involving these substances. 
Id. 
 88. See Department of Health and Human Services’ Role at the NDPO, THE BEACON-NAT’L 
DOMESTIC PREPAREDNESS NEWSLETTER (National Domestic Preparedness Office, Washington, D.C.) 
June 15, 1999, at 7.  
 89. Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act, 42 U.S.C. § 5121, et seq. 
(2000). 
 90. Foreword to INTERIM FEDERAL RESPONSE PLAN, supra note 31 (“The Federal Response Plan 
(FRP) . . . implements the Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act, as 
amended, to assist state and local governments when a major disaster or emergency overwhelms their 
ability to respond effectively to save lives.”). In 1999, FEMA completed a revised version of the FRP 
that substantially updated the original 1992 version. See id. By contrast, the Interim 2003 FRP reflects 
mostly terminology changes due to the passage of the Homeland Security Act of 2002 that moved 
FEMA under the DHS. Id. FEMA considers the January 2003 FRP “interim” until DHS can complete 
a thorough review. Id. 
 91. Presidential Decision Directive 39, signed June 21, 1995, available at 
http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/odp/docs/pdd39.htm (last visited Feb. 27, 2005) (abstract of classified 
document). PDD-39 is a classified document because it assigns specific missions to federal agencies 
responding to a terrorism threat or attack. Id.  
 92. Id.  
 93. Id. Crisis Management is defined as “measures to identify, acquire, and plan the use of 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol83/iss1/6
p385 Ryan book pages.doc 9/2/2005  
 
 
 
 
 
2005] RESPONDING TO BIOTERRORISM 401 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Agency94 in charge of “Consequence Management,” defined broadly as 
protecting health and safety and restoring essential government services 
after an attack.95 The other four agencies listed as signatories to the 
“Terrorism Incident Annex” portion of the Federal Response Plan are 
charged with providing technical support to the overall channeling of 
resources by the DOJ.96 Thus, in the case of a bioterrorism attack, DHHS 
and the CDC—the agencies with the greatest expertise and resources in 
managing a public health emergency—may be reduced to a supporting 
role.97 Some experts have criticized this arrangement and questions remain 
about the FBI’s ability to effectively respond to a bioterrorism event.98
C. Recognizing Problems in Federal Preparedness and Response 
The anthrax attacks of 2001 strained the federal framework designed to 
prepare and respond to bioterrorism attacks and exposed several 
underlying weaknesses that spurred congressional action.99  
First, the lack of a singular piece of legislation or federal statute 
addressing federal bioterrorism preparedness and response activities 
created a funding vacuum for vital programs. Thus, simply not having a 
bioterrorism-focused law on the books resulted in inadequate or unfocused 
resources needed to anticipate, prevent, and/or resolve a threat or act of terrorism.” FED. EMERGENCY 
MGMT. AGENCY, TERRORISM INCIDENT ANNEX TI-15 (2003) [hereinafter TERRORISM INCIDENT 
ANNEX]. 
 94. The Interim FRP now names the DHS as the lead federal agency for consequence 
management, although FEMA still fulfills this role. TERRIORISM INCIDENT ANNEX, supra note 93, at 
TI-3; Presidential Decision Directive 39, supra note 91. 
 95. Consequence management is defined as “measures to protect public health and safety, restore 
essential government services, and provide emergency relief to governments, businesses, and 
individuals affected by the consequences of terrorism.” TERRORISM INCIDENT ANNEX, supra note 93, 
at TI-15. 
 96. Id. at TI-1. The other signatories to the Terrorism Incident Index (in addition to DOJ/FBI and 
Department of Homeland Security) are: the Department of Defense, Department of Health and Human 
Services, Department of Energy, and the Environmental Protection Agency. Id. 
 97. According to the Terrorism Incident Annex, “[D]HHS will activate technical operations 
capabilities to support the Federal response to threats or acts of WMD terrorism.” Id. at TI-13. The 
Terrorism Incident Annex suggests that DHHS could activate its own Medical Services Support Plan 
in response to a biological attack, but still must coordinate everything through DOJ or DHS. Id. at TI-
13. The CDC is not mentioned in the Terrorism Incident Annex. 
 98. See Sutton, supra note 30, at 122 (stating that “[t]he shortcomings of the FBI within the 
context of its current leadership in biodefense, preparedness and response have been identified to 
include its lack of expertise with respect to all weapons of mass destruction”).  
 99. See 147 CONG. REC. S13,902-03 (daily ed. Dec. 20, 2001) (statement of Sen. Kennedy) (“In 
recent weeks, a handful of anthrax cases stretched our health care system to the breaking point. A 
larger attack could be a disaster, and the attack of the past weeks has clearly sounded the alarm . . . and 
we’re not ready yet.”). 
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spending on a multitude of diverse civilian and military functions 
addressing the bioterrorism threat.100
Second, as a result of a fragmented approach in developing 
preparedness and response activities, those agencies with the most public 
health expertise were not assigned leading roles relative to other agencies 
involved in preparing for a bioterrorist attack.101
Third, vital components of the federal response lacked adequate 
capabilities to respond to the anthrax attacks.102 For example, a GAO 
report analyzing the CDC’s performance during the attacks found that: (1) 
the CDC was not ready to assume the lead in responding to a bioterrorism 
attack, but rather was more prepared to provide a supporting role to state 
and local responders; (2) the CDC had significant difficulty in 
communicating with other agencies and the public during the attacks; and 
(3) the CDC lacked specific expertise to manage the health consequences 
of anthrax.103 In addition, other significant components of the federal 
response such as the NPS and the NDMS did not have a bioterrorism 
focus.104 The NPS had limited capabilities with respect to deploying 
specific vaccinations against specific biological agents and had no 
program to amass the quantity of vaccine needed to respond to events such 
as a smallpox attack.105 Similarly, the NDMS needed upgrades in training 
and resources to enable its personnel to provide appropriate treatment 
during a biological attack.106
Finally, and maybe most importantly, section 511 of the AEDPA and 
the rule promulgated by the CDC to regulate the transfer of dangerous 
biological agents fell short of establishing a true tracking system of 
 100. See Joshua Green, Weapons of Mass Confusion, WASH. MONTHLY, May 2001, at 1 
(discussing how Congress’s rush to respond to the threat of bioterrorism after the release of sarin gas 
in Tokyo led to massive and uncoordinated federal spending on questionably effective military and 
civilian response programs).  
 101. See supra note 97 and accompanying text. 
 102. See 147 CONG. REC. S13,902-04 (daily ed. Dec. 20, 2001) (statement of Sen. Kennedy): 
Usually, a few dozen CDC experts respond to a disease outbreak. But CDC assigned nearly 
500 specialists to the anthrax attacks. One out of eight employees at CDC headquarters in 
Atlanta is working on the current outbreak. Staffers worked round the clock and slept in 
hallways and only 18 cases of actual illness was [sic] known. 
Id. 
 103. RESPONSE TO ANTHRAX INCIDENTS OF 2001, supra note 11, at 5.  
 104. See infra notes 105–106.  
 105. See GEN. ACCT. OFF., GAO-01-666T, COMBATING TERRORISM: ACCOUNTABILITY OVER 
MEDICAL SUPPLIES NEEDS FURTHER IMPROVEMENT 11–12 (2001). 
 106. See GEN. ACCT. OFF., GAO-01-14, COMBATING TERRORISM: FEDERAL RESPONSE TEAMS 
PROVIDE VARIED CAPABILITIES; OPPORTUNITIES REMAIN TO IMPROVE COORDINATION 22 (2000). 
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dangerous pathogens.107 By stopping short of requiring all those in 
possession of dangerous agents to register with the federal government, 
Congress and the CDC missed an opportunity to trace the origin of the 
anthrax that terrified much of the United States in 2001.108
Thus, in light of these shortcomings and under public pressure to 
address bioterrorism legislatively, Congress proposed and enacted the 
Public Health Security and Bioterrorism Preparedness and Response Act 
of 2002 (“Bioterrorism Response Act”).109  
D. The Public Health Security and Bioterrorism Preparedness and 
Response Act of 2002 
Heralded as the “Nation’s first line of defense against bioterrorism,”110 
the Bioterrorism Response Act sets forth provisions for national 
preparedness, enhancing controls on dangerous biological agents, 
protecting the safety and security of the food and drug supply, and 
protecting drinking water supplies from acts of terrorism.111 
Representative Billy Tauzin and Senator Ted Kennedy introduced similar 
versions of the Bioterrorism Response Act in their respective chambers in 
December of 2001112 while the country was still coping with the anthrax 
 107. See § 511(b)-(f), 100 Stat. at 1243 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 262 note); 42 C.F.R. § 72.6(a)-(c). 
Note that these provisions only covered the transfer of select agents before the passage of the Public 
Health Security and Bioterrorism Preparedness and Response Act of 2002. 
 108. See David Malakoff & Martin Enserink, New Law May Force Labs to Screen Workers, 294 
SCIENCE 971 (2001) (noting that the lack of a registration requirement for those possessing deadly 
biological agents caused the CDC much embarrassment in 2001 because it could not “specify how 
many U.S. labs might have produced the anthrax that . . . contaminated U.S. mailrooms”). 
 109. Public Health Security and Bioterrorism Preparedness and Response Act of 2002, Pub. L. 
No. 107-188, 116 Stat. 594 (2002).  
 110. 148 CONG. REC. H2,838-41 (daily ed. May 22, 2002) (statement of Rep. Tauzin). 
 111. Public Health Security and Bioterrorism Preparedness and Response Act of 2002, Pub. L. 
No. 107-188, 116 Stat. 594 (2002). Note that this Note deals with Title I and Title II of the Act 
concerning national preparedness and enhancing controls on dangerous biological agents, respectively. 
Id. Title III addresses protecting the safety and security of the food and drug supply, and Title IV 
covers protecting drinking water supplies. Id. Titles III and IV present topics that are beyond the scope 
of this Note; however, new regulations concerning food protection adopted pursuant to the Act have 
generated academic interest. See 21 C.F.R § 1 (requiring all domestic and foreign food facilities that 
hold food for U.S. consumption to register with the FDA); 21 C.F.R. § 21 (requiring foreign food 
producers to give the FDA notice before importation of food into the U.S.); Nicholas Freitag, Federal 
Food and Drug Act Violations, 41 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 647, 666 (2004). For a review of the Act’s 
provisions affecting drinking water safety, see Varu Chilakamarri, A New Instrument in National 
Security: The Legislative Attempt to Combat Terrorism Via the Safe Drinking Water Act, 91 GEO. L.J. 
927, 930–32 (2003). 
 112. The House version was H.R. 3448, and the Senate version S. 1765 (107th Congress). Public 
Health Security and Bioterrorism Preparedness and Response Act of 2002, CONGRESSIONAL 
INFORMATION SERVICE, LEGISLATIVE HISTORIES OF U.S. PUBLIC LAWS 2002, 113 (2002). 
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attacks.113 However, Congress did not adopt a final measure until June of 
2002.114
The anthrax attacks highlighted the inherent weaknesses in the federal 
government’s preparedness and response capabilities and provided the 
context for the Bioterrorism Response Act’s passage.115 But, does the Act 
really address these problems? Do the provisions go far enough in 
reducing fragmentation and enhancing cooperation? Does it really help the 
federal government make us safer? These questions provide the 
underpinnings for the following analysis of Title I and Title II (the 
preparedness and response titles, respectively) of the Bioterrorism 
Response Act. 
III. ANALYSIS 
A. Title I—National Preparedness for Bioterrorism and Other Public 
Health Emergencies 
1. Addressing Bioterror at a National Level 
Section 101 of the Bioterrorism Response Act amends the Public 
Health Service Act to authorize the Secretary of DHHS to establish a 
National Preparedness Plan “building upon the core public health 
capabilities” already present in the statute.116 The section states that the 
plan is to have a “[n]ational approach” that coordinates all bioterrorism 
activities with state and local governments.117 Further, the Act sets out five 
“[p]reparedness goals” for addressing the bioterrorism threat that focus on 
providing “effective assistance to State and local governments.”118 Finally, 
the Act makes it clear that this section in no way expands the regulatory 
power of the Secretary beyond what is already authorized in the statute.119
 113. See RESPONSE TO ANTHRAX INCIDENTS OF 2001, supra note 11, at 36.  
 114. Public Health Security and Bioterrorism Preparedness and Response Act of 2002, Pub. L. 
No. 107-188, 116 Stat. 594, 697 (2002). 
 115. See supra notes 99–107 and sources cited therein. 
 116. Public Health Security and Bioterrorism Preparedness and Response Act of 2002, Pub. L. 
No. 107-188, § 101(a)(1), 116 Stat. 594, 596 (2002).  
 117. § 101(a)(2), 116 Stat. at 596.  
 118. § 101(b), 116 Stat. at 597. The five “preparedness goals” of the Act are: (1) effective 
assistance to state and local governments; (2) ensuring state and local governments have adequate 
surveillance, laboratory, medical personnel, and communications capacity; (3) development of drugs 
and vaccines (countermeasures) against biological agents; (4) ensuring cooperation and preventing 
overlap in federal, state and local activities; and (5) enhancing health facility readiness. § 101(b)(1)-
(5), 116 Stat. at 597. 
 119. § 101(d), 116 Stat. at 598. 
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Section 101 provides a good illustration of the strengths and 
weaknesses of the Act as a whole. The section succeeds in placing the 
federal government at the forefront of planning for a bioterrorism attack 
via the National Preparedness Plan, but it fails in that it immediately 
embraces the present federalism model of the public health system and 
explicitly does not expand federal powers.120 Thus, one of the lingering 
questions after the anthrax attacks—who will have the primary leadership 
role in responding to a bioterrorism attack—remains unanswered.121 This 
has two main consequences. First, the benefit of latching on to the existing 
structure is that it may avoid some of the problems associated with 
assigning the federal government the primary role in responding to a 
bioterrorism attack.122 This approach helps eschew the quagmire of federal 
bureaucratic red tape and makes the lack of federal “first responders” a 
non-issue.123 Second, however, this maintenance of the status quo in 
statutory authority may make it more difficult for the federal government 
to fully utilize its resources.124 Maintaining this uneasy balance among the 
federal, state, and local governments has the effect of slowing the flow of 
federal dollars to the urgent needs of the public health system125 and 
This section may not be construed as expanding or limiting any of the authorities of the 
Secretary that, on the day before the date of the enactment of the Public Health Security and 
Bioterrorism Preparedness and Response Act of 2002, were in effect with respect to preparing 
for and responding effectively to bioterrorism and other public health emergencies. 
Id. 
 120. James Hodge best describes the present federalism model of the public health system: 
There is no central public health system in the United States. Instead, a collaborative 
workforce of federal, state, and local authorities work in conjunction with other inter-level 
agencies . . . to accomplish public health outcomes. In this system, public health roles and 
responsibilities of the federal, state, and local levels of government are complex and unclear. 
Hodge, Salient Issues in Public Health Law, supra note 22, at 257.  
 121. See Sutton, supra note 30, at 118 (posing the question, “[w]hy does the federal government 
seem in such a confused state concerning the appropriate preparedness and response 
responsibilities?”).  
 122. See Hodge, Salient Issues in Public Health Law, supra note 22, at 258 (stating that 
“[c]hoosing to assign a primary leadership role to the federal government for responding to 
bioterrorism threats does have its drawbacks.”).  
 123. Id. 
 124. See Sutton, Struggle to Protect States’ Sovereignty, supra note 22, at 102 (stating “[w]ith the 
threat of bioterrorism, people are likely to expect federal preparedness for a national security threat. 
. . . [T]hey may be unaware that the long-held powers of the states’ governments, which have so ably 
protected the public since colonial times, may well prove to be an impediment to the effective role of 
the federal government.”). 
 125. In a December 2003 report, the Trust for America’s Health, a non-profit health promotion 
organization, found that only half the states had full access to the federal money made available by the 
Bioterrorism Preparedness Act of 2002 because much of the aid was “wrapped up in red tape.” 
SHELLEY A. HEARNE ET AL., READY OR NOT? PROTECTING THE PUBLIC’S HEALTH IN THE AGE OF 
BIOTERRORISM 2 (2003).  
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hinders a true response plan for pathogens that cover multiple 
jurisdictions.126
2. Addressing Fragmentation 
Section 102(a) establishes the Assistant Secretary for Public Health and 
Emergency Preparedness (“ASPHEP”) under DHHS.127 The section 
consolidates all coordination activities under the ASPHEP and brings all 
of DHHS’s emergency response activities that relate to bioterrorism under 
the ASPHEP’s control.128 Thus, it is the assistant secretary’s job to 
communicate with other parts of the federal government and state and 
local officials.129 Section 108 addresses coordination problems among 
agencies with public health responsibilities by establishing a single federal 
working group on bioterrorism.130 This working group is headed by the 
Secretary of DHHS and its primary purpose is to coordinate twelve 
enumerated aspects of bioterrorism preparedness, including “clarifying the 
responsibilities among Federal officials . . . for related revisions of . . . the 
Federal response plan.”131  
Obvious fragmentation and confusion within the federal government in 
responding to the anthrax attacks of 2001 was the major impetus for the 
Act’s coordination provisions.132 However, the Act falls short of 
adequately addressing these problems. First, consolidation of DHHS’ 
response capabilities under the ASPHEP is a logical and much needed step 
in an agency with the significant potential for taking a commanding role in 
dealing with a bioterrorism event; however, no role is outlined for the 
ASPHEP in dealing with the CDC—the most important arm of DHHS’ 
response capabilities.133 This hinders communication between the CDC 
 126. See Sutton, Struggle to Protect States’ Sovereignty, supra note 22, at 101 (noting that it is 
necessary for the federal government to establish a “coordinated national response” to bioterrorism 
because it is impossible for the states, acting as fifty independent sovereigns, to do so).  
 127. § 102(a)(1), 116 Stat. at 599.  
 128. § 102(a)(2)(B), 116 Stat. at 599.  
 129. § 102(a)(2)(A)-(D), 116 Stat. at 599–600. Also, note that the ASPHEP is responsible for 
overseeing DHHS programs like the National Disaster Medical System and the bioterrorism activities 
of the CDC. Id.  
 130. § 108(a), 116 Stat. at 609; see also H.R. CONF. REP. NO. 107-481, at 110 (2002). 
 131. § 108(a)(1), 116 Stat. at 609-10.  
 132. See Stephen Labaton & Robert Pear, Anthrax Menace Exposes Badly Coordinated Defense, 
N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 18, 2001, at B7 (noting the congressional concern over lack of coordination in 
handling the anthrax attacks and quoting Senator Fred Thompson (R-TN) as saying, “The good news 
is that there are many agencies working on all of these [anthrax] issues. The bad news is that there are 
many federal agencies working on all of these issues.”). 
 133. See GEN. ACCT. OFF., GAO-04-219, CENTERS FOR DISEASE CONTROL AND PREVENTION: 
AGENCY LEADERSHIP TAKING STEPS TO IMPROVE MANAGEMENT AND PLANNING, BUT CHALLENGES 
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and the managing arm of DHHS and increases the chances that the CDC 
will again be on its own in coordinating a response.134 Second, the Act 
fails to meaningfully address the problematic FBI-CDC relationship that 
crippled federal response to the anthrax attacks.135 This omission leaves 
the FBI free to spearhead the response to a bioterrorism attack and 
effectively “freeze-out” the CDC much in the same way as it did in 
2001.136 Consequently, Congress may have spent a billion dollars to 
revitalize the CDC and the public health communication system,137 but left 
its usefulness contingent on the willingness of the FBI to share 
information during an attack. This situation is one that puts too much faith 
in an agency that has struggled to understand bioterrorism and has been 
heavily criticized for hoarding critical information in the past.138 Finally, 
establishing a unified working group for all federal agencies generates the 
correct approach to the problem, and making review of the FRP a priority 
poses the opportunity for DHHS via the CDC to play a larger role.139 
REMAIN 5 (2004). But cf. Katherine Eban, Waiting for Bioterror: is our public health system ready?, 
THE NATION, Dec. 9, 2002, at 11 [hereinafter Eban, Waiting for Bioterror] (noting that the current 
ASPHEP, Jerome Hauer, does keep in contact with the director of the CDC).  
 134. The CDC was heavily criticized for poor performance during the anthrax attacks of 2001 and 
was not prepared to handle the laboratory and diagnostic work associated with a limited number of 
anthrax exposures. See Eban, Waiting for Bioterror, supra note 133, at 13 (stating that “[f]or three 
weeks . . . Americans seeking clear information from the CDC were out of luck”). 
 135. Marc Siegel, The Anthrax Fumble: Bureaucratic Timidity and Turf Battles Needlessly Put 
Many Americans at Risk, THE NATION, Mar. 18, 2002, at 14.  
 136.  
In October, when the first anthrax-laden envelopes were received, the FBI froze the Centers 
for Disease Control and Prevention out of the high-profile investigation, according to CDC 
officials. That meant half the country’s experts on bio-attacks and the only scientists with a 
special interest in public health were kept out of the loop. 
Id. 
 137. See § 103(c)(1)(A), 116 Stat. at 603. “In FY 2003, the CDC is providing $1.03 billion to 
continue upgrading state and local capacity to prepare for bioterrorism and other public health 
emergencies.” Federal Biodefense Readiness: Hearing Before the Senate Comm. on Health, 
Education, Labor and Pensions, 108th Cong. 34 (2003) (statement of Julie L. Gerberding, M.D., 
M.P.H., Director of the CDC). 
 138. See Sutton, supra note 30, at 122–23 (noting that—even after it was discovered that the 
Florida anthrax cases were terrorist related—the FBI allowed the destruction of over 100 vials of 
different anthrax strains collected at Iowa State University that could have been used to identify the 
source of the anthrax via DNA testing); William J. Broad et al., Experts See F.B.I. Missteps 
Hampering Anthrax Inquiry, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 9, 2001, at A1; Marilyn Werber Serafini, Who Goes, 
Who Stays?, NAT’L JOURNAL, Sept. 21, 2002, at 2706, 2707 (quoting a congressional aide regarding 
the FBI-CDC relationship, “you just don’t have the kind of coordination that’s necessary to fight 
bioterrorism . . . [h]ow can the public health community work with the FBI? It’s critical that we do, but 
otherwise it’s a joke. The FBI isn’t that capable on its own.”). 
 139. See supra notes 90–97. The CDC is not currently a part of the Federal Response Plan, even 
though it would play a central role in any type of bioterrorism event. 
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However, with no reporting provisions, there is little incentive to generate 
hard and fast solutions to fragmentation problems.140
3. Upgrading the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention 
Section 103 states that “Congress finds that the Centers for Disease 
Control . . . has an essential role in . . . combating public health threats and 
requires secure and modern facilities, and . . . improved capabilities related 
to bioterrorism.”141 To upgrade the CDC labs, the section authorizes $300 
million in appropriations for building new facilities and renovating old 
ones.142 To improve capacity, the section gives the Secretary of DHHS 
power to “officially” establish the HAN as the main system for 
surveillance and communication between federal, state, and local public 
health officials, private laboratories, hospitals, and personnel of other 
health care facilities.143  
In enacting section 103, Congress did two very important things. First, 
it gave the CDC the contracting power and the funding to procure a much-
needed facelift and to provide security for labs that hold the most 
dangerous pathogens in the world.144 Second, Congress recognized the 
“essential role” that the CDC must play in preparedness and response by 
both literally stating it and providing authorizing language for CDC 
capacity.145 This language is seemingly insignificant, but it gives the CDC 
a very important seat at the table when essential funds are appropriated for 
bioterrorism.146 However, while the Act provides funding for facilities and 
communication networks, it ignores the need for expanding the biodefense 
workforce at the CDC.147 One recent report noted that 44.6% of the CDC 
 140. See § 108(a), 116 Stat. at 610 (note the absence of reporting requirements).  
 141. § 103(a)(1), 116 Stat. at 603.  
 142. § 103(a)(2)(A), 116 Stat. at 603; § 103(c)(1)(A), 116 Stat. at 603.  
 143. § 103(b)(1), 116 Stat. at 603. Subsection 103(b)(2) also requires that this system be secure, 
and provide for the timely transmission of essential information concerning a bioterrorism attack. Id. 
§ 103(b)(2). 
 144. See 148 CONG. REC. H2,839 (daily ed. May 22, 2002) (statement of Rep. Linder) (“[T]he 
CDC is a group of world class intellects in a Third World facility. It has no security.”); Judith Miller, 
New Biolabs Stir a Debate Over Secrecy and Safety, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 10, 2004, at F1 (noting that 
security at the CDC has been tightened over concerns about the deadly biological agents housed there). 
 145. § 103(a)(1), 116 Stat. at 603. 
 146. See supra note 100.  
 147. The only provision that somewhat addresses potential shortfalls in trained health-care 
professionals for biodefense is section 106(a), “The Secretary may make awards of grants and 
cooperative agreements to appropriate public and nonprofit private health or educational entities . . . 
for the purpose of providing low-interest loans, partial scholarships, partial fellowships, revolving loan 
funds, or other cost-sharing forms of assistance for the education and training of individuals in any 
category of health professions for which there is a shortage.” § 106(a), 116 Stat. at 607-08.  
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employees with medical backgrounds and 47% with biological knowledge 
would be eligible to retire by fiscal year 2008.148 The Act overlooks these 
troubling statistics and the impacts are likely to be severe. First, the CDC 
was stretched thin during the anthrax attacks because it lacked expertise in 
dealing with agents of bioterrorism and—regardless of facilities—a sharp 
decline in biodefense talent will only make the problem worse by 
understaffing key positions.149 Second, once employees are lost to 
retirement or the private sector, the government is at a disadvantage in 
hiring new workers in the field because of the lack of competitive 
compensation and promotion opportunities.150 Finally, the Act’s failure to 
focus on human-capital needs makes it less likely that the CDC will be 
able to adequately fund human resources.151 This makes it difficult to 
assess the weaknesses in biodefense staffing within the Agency and to 
locate qualified persons for those positions.152 Thus, by failing to address 
this imminent loss of human infrastructure, the Act nearly undermines the 
goal of truly “revitalizing” the CDC.  
4. Establishing the NDMS and the SNS 
Section 102(b) maintains the NDMS’s collaborative approach among 
federal, state, and private entities, and gives the Secretary wide latitude to 
activate the NDMS when “the Secretary has determined that a location is 
 148. THE P’SHIP FOR PUB. SERV., HOMELAND INSECURITY: BUILDING THE EXPERTISE TO DEFEND 
AMERICA FROM BIOTERRORISM 18 (2003). This report estimated that the CDC could lose as many as 
1,500 personnel with medical experience by 2008. Id.  
 149. See RESPONSE TO ANTHRAX INCIDENTS OF 2001, supra note 11, at 5; THE P’SHIP FOR PUB. 
SERV., supra note 148, at 12 (“The anthrax attack, a small scale attack according to most biodefense 
experts, stretched our resources to capacity because the limited supply of biodefense talent available to 
CDC has diminished in recent years . . . [T]he CDC may employ only one to three experts in any given 
disease specialty.”). 
 150. This is a problem plaguing almost all federal agencies and specifically those like the CDC 
where the personnel they need to employ in biodefense (doctors, disease experts, etc.) can command 
much larger compensation in academia or in the private sector. GEN. ACCT. OFF., GAO-03-120, HIGH 
RISK SERIES: STRATEGIC HUMAN CAPITAL MANAGEMENT 3, 14 (2003). 
 151. See THE P’SHIP FOR PUB. SERV., supra note 148, at 20 (“Since 1992, human resource support 
to agencies government-wide has declined by approximately 27 percent, and by as much as nearly 50 
percent in some biodefense agencies.”).  
 152. One DHHS employee recently remarked, 
There are simply not enough human resources professionals to perform the personnel work of 
the agency. We not only hire a lot of employees, but we must successfully screen a large 
number of applications to select the best. Unfortunately, we do not have enough human 
resources professionals with the scientific or technical understanding needed to provide 
managers with strategic advice or assistance. 
Id. 
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at risk of a pubic health emergency.”153 In addition, the section gives 
intermittent employees of the NDMS qualified immunity under the 
Federal Tort Claims Act while they are performing health-related 
functions, and gives them some of the same employment rights as military 
personnel while deployed by the Secretary.154
Section 121 formally establishes the Strategic National Stockpile 
(“SNS”) and authorizes the Secretary of DHHS to maintain the SNS “to 
provide for the emergency health security of the United States . . . in the 
event of a bioterrorist attack or other public health emergency.”155 But, 
most importantly, section 121(b)(1) requires that the SNS contain enough 
smallpox vaccine, as determined by the Secretary of DHHS, “to be 
sufficient to meet the health security needs of the United States.”156
The NDMS and the SNS represent two of the most important programs 
included in federal preparedness and response that previously did not 
focus on bioterrorism or biological weapons readiness.157 Thus, the 
codification of these programs under the auspices of the Bioterrorism 
Response Act is significant because it makes bioterrorism response a 
central concern. For the NDMS this means that—in setting criteria for the 
system under section 102(c)—the Secretary can include bioterrorism-
related training for all personnel and improve expertise with respect to 
handling certain pathogens. For the SNS, this means the inclusion of 
biological agent-specific countermeasures in the actual stockpiles and 
considerable funding to facilitate the development of a smallpox vaccine 
stockpile. But, weaknesses remain that were not addressed by the Act. In 
April of 2003, GAO found that the planning necessary to implement the 
distribution of the SNS in a time of crisis was incomplete.158 This situation 
could have been prevented by mandating “test distributions” of the system 
in a similar fashion as those required under section 102(b)(2)(C) of the Act 
for the NDMS.159 However, the SNS distribution planning under section 
121 is largely discretionary and without mandates that the system actually 
be tested.160 Likewise, under the smallpox provisions of the SNS, the Act 
 153. § 102(b)(3)(A)(ii), 116 Stat. at 600.  
 154. § 102(d)(2), 116 Stat. at 601; § 102(e)(3)(A), 116 Stat. at 601.  
 155. § 121(a)(1), 116 Stat. at 612. Note that the “National Pharmaceutical Stockpile” was renamed 
the “Strategic National Stockpile.”  
 156. § 121(b)(1), 116 Stat. at 612. 
 157. See supra notes 105–06.  
 158. See INFECTIOUS DISEASE OUTBREAKS, supra note 20, at 25. 
 159. See § 102(b)(2)(C), 116 Stat. at 600. 
 160. The only subsection that deals with planning states, “The Secretary, in managing the 
stockpile . . . shall . . . (E) devise plans for the effective and timely supply-chain management of the 
stockpile, in consultation with appropriate Federal, State and local agencies, and the public and private 
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fails to state how the SNS will be used in conjunction with an actual 
vaccination program.161 This has had a negative effect on the most recent 
vaccination efforts because some states—in order to cut costs—decided to 
forgo vaccinating health-care workers now in reliance on the SNS for 
coverage if they needed it in the future.162 This sets up a dangerous 
situation where possibly hundreds of thousands of health-care workers 
would depend on the SNS for smallpox vaccinations in a very short period 
of time, thus making distribution to the general public more difficult.163  
B. Title II—Enhancing Controls on Dangerous Biological Agents and 
Toxins 
Section 201 amends 42 U.S.C. § 262 to significantly tighten the 
regulations concerning the transfer, possession, and availability of 
dangerous biological agents.164 Subsection (d) requires that anyone using, 
possessing, or transferring a select agent must register with the Secretary 
and that the regulations must ensure they possess the substance for a 
lawful purpose.165 To restrict access to these substances, the regulation 
must include provisions requiring registered entities to prohibit access to 
anyone that does not have a need to handle the agents and to submit to the 
Attorney General the names and identifying information of anyone who is 
allowed access.166 The Attorney General then screens these names to 
health care infrastructure.” § 121(a)(2)(E), 116 Stat. at 612.  
 161. See § 121(b), 116 Stat. at 612. Note the omission of any implementation mechanisms or 
references to other vaccination programs. 
 162. See Holly Myers et al., The Threat of Smallpox: Eradicated But Not Erased: A Review of the 
Fiscal Logistical and Legal Obstacles Impacting the Phase I Vaccination Program, J. HOMELAND 
SEC., Feb. 2004, at 6 (noting that when states were asked to estimate how much smallpox vaccine they 
would need to immunize their designated health-care workers some states, “decided . . . that they 
would rely upon the Strategic National Stockpile should the need for more vaccine arise.”). This 
vaccination program was a part of President Bush’s plan to vaccinate about 450,000 “first responders” 
from all states. Id. Congress did, however, pass legislation authorizing benefits and other 
compensation for “first responders” who are injured by the administration of the smallpox vaccine. See 
Smallpox Emergency Personnel Protection Act of 2003, Pub. L. No. 108-20, 117 Stat. 638 (to be 
codified at 42 U.S.C. § 239). 
 163. See White House Press Release, Protecting Americans: Smallpox Vaccination Program 
(Dec. 13, 2002), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/12/20021213-1.html. 
 164. See H.R. CONF. REP. NO. 107-481, at 119 (2002). The principal way in which this is 
accomplished is the promulgation of regulations governing the possession of any “select agents” that 
“pose a severe threat to public health and safety.” § 201(a)(1)(A), 116 Stat. at 637. 
 165. § 201(d)(1), 116 Stat. at 638. Note, however, that section 201 continues the current flexibility 
of the Secretary to exempt things like Botox from regulation, and exempts certain clinical and 
diagnostic labs from registration when they are in possession of a “select agent” contained in a 
laboratory specimen. See H.R. CONF. REP. NO. 107-481, at 121–22 (2002).  
 166. § 201(e)(2), 116 Stat. at 639. 
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“weed-out” anyone who is reasonably suspected of being a terrorist, is 
affiliated with a terrorist or criminal organization, or is a spy for a foreign 
government.167  
Section 201 is a significant step in closing the loopholes left wide open 
by the AEDPA.168 First, it regulates the possession and use of select 
agents—not just the transfer of those materials.169 With this regulation in 
place, the CDC can finally specify who has control of agents of 
bioterrorism, where those agents are located, and why that entity or 
individual possesses that type of agent.170 This provides a complete 
tracking system that will aid the CDC in identifying particular strains or 
forms of an agent by making available millions of samples for 
comparative DNA analysis.171 In addition, health officials may be better 
able to determine whether a breach of laboratory security may endanger 
the surrounding community because information on the types of pathogens 
stored in particular labs will be readily available.172
Second, the Act addresses the CDC’s reluctance to regulate the 
scientific community by delegating screening duties to the Attorney 
General.173 This situation has two main benefits. One, it keeps the CDC 
clear of battles over access that have the potential to hurt its credibility 
with the largely self-governed scientific community.174 Two, it makes for 
much more stringent enforcement as the FBI will be in charge of doing 
background checks and enforcing the denial of access.175 This is a 
common sense arrangement as the CDC, like many other public health 
 167. § 201(e)(3)(A)-(B), 116 Stat. at 639-40. The section also provides for administrative and 
judicial review of persons denied access and requires information that could jeopardize national 
security to be reviewed ex parte. § 201(e)(7), 116 Stat. at 641. 
 168. See supra note 86, discussing loopholes in the AEDPA of 1996. 
 169. § 201(c)(1), 116 Stat. at 638. 
 170. Up until this point, the CDC had no way of knowing what specific pathogens a laboratory 
might possess unless those pathogens were transferred after the enactment of section 511 of the 
AEDPA and the promulgation of 42 C.F.R. § 72.6 in 1996. See 61 Fed. Reg. 29,328 (June 10, 1996) 
(stating that the pre-1996 regulation “does not . . . contain provisions restricting parties who may 
transfer these agents.”); see supra note 108. 
 171. See Sutton, supra note 30, at 123. 
 172. See supra notes 55, 57 and accompanying text. 
 173. § 201(e)(2), 116 Stat. at 639. 
 174. See Neil Munro, The Bioterror Threat Is Putting Pressure on Scientists to Govern 
Themselves Better. Will They, or Will the Public and Politics Intervene, NAT’L JOURNAL, Sept. 6, 
2003, at 2698, 2700–02. 
 175. See Hodge, Salient Issues in Public Health Law, supra note 22, at 258 (stating, 
“Bioterrorism, by definition, is the product of criminal activity . . . Every bioterrorism event thus 
involves a criminal investigation that is outside the purview of public health authorities.”). 
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organizations, has eschewed involvement in criminal matters and this type 
of intelligence gathering.176  
Finally, the section mandates a reporting requirement—absent from 
CDC’s current regulations—that requires anyone in possession of a select 
agent to notify federal, state, and local law enforcement agencies 
immediately if an agent is lost or stolen.177 This is a vital update to the 
select agent regulations because it sets in motion an immediate response 
by law enforcement and gives public health authorities notice of what type 
of pathogen terrorists might use in an attack. Specifically, it could lead to a 
reduction in casualties because responders could prepare countermeasures 
for the missing or stolen biological agent.178 In addition, these types of 
reports have already led to more effective enforcement of the select agent 
rule as the federal government has vigorously pursued investigations of 
missing or lost pathogens.179  
IV. PROPOSALS 
Congress’ passage of the Bioterrorism Response Act addressed several 
major problem areas of federal preparedness and response identified after 
the anthrax attacks of 2001. However, significant areas for improvement 
remain and caution must be encouraged. 
First, Congress must further consider options for clarifying the role of 
DHHS and the CDC in initial terrorism response. The Terrorism Incident 
Annex to the Federal Response Plan must be revised with a bioterrorism 
attack in mind and the CDC must be specifically included in all of the 
health-related provisions. This will enable the agency with the most 
bioterrorism expertise to take the lead in responding to an attack as a 
public health crisis, instead of a criminal investigation.180
 176. See id. “Public health authorities resist participating in criminal investigations primarily 
because there is the potential that public health authorities could be seen by community members as 
health police.” Id. 
 177. § 201(e)(8), 116 Stat. at 642.  
 178. Cf. Green, Weapons of Mass Confusion, supra note 100, at 4 (noting that the New York City 
response plan for a bioterrorism attack calls for “scrupulously monitor[ing] sales of diarrhea 
medication as an indicator that a biological attack may have occurred.”). 
 179. See David Malakoff, Plague of Lies Lands Texas Scientist in Jail, 299 SCIENCE 489 (2003) 
(relating how the FBI vigorously investigated and arrested a Texas Tech University researcher who 
reported thirty vials of plague missing from his laboratory to cover up the fact that he failed to 
document destroying them).  
 180. See supra notes 134–39 and accompanying text. 
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Second, Congress should act to ensure that statutory requirements of 
the SNS will be met. Congress has made progress toward this goal by 
passing proposals such as the Project BioShield Act of 2004,181 which 
authorizes the purchase of millions of doses of vaccines and drugs to 
respond to anthrax and smallpox attacks and makes the government a 
guaranteed purchaser of new counter-terrorism drugs produced by private 
industry. Yet, more must be done to ensure that these newly acquired 
doses can actually be administered in the event of a bioterrorism attack. 
Congress should mandate the testing of the SNS distribution systems and 
specifically allocate appropriations to coordinate the distribution of 
vaccines and treatments through first responders. However, Congress must 
also be mindful of its oversight functions. Bigger and more expensive 
response mechanisms are not always better and can lead to the kind of 
fragmentation and unfocused spending that left the CDC unable to respond 
to an attack that only sickened twenty-two people. 
Third, Congress must confront the impending shortage of skilled 
biodefense workers. This means investing significant resources in keeping 
medical and biological professionals employed in agencies like the CDC 
by offering competitive compensation and opportunities for advancement 
that more closely mirror the private sector. It also entails focusing 
resources on skilled human resources personnel to identify staffing 
weaknesses in agencies engaged in biodefense. 
Finally, the federal government must continue to revamp, revise, and 
fully fund federal bioterrorism programs. The lessons of the anthrax 
attacks of 2001 are already beginning to fade, and public fears of smallpox 
outbreaks and biological terrorism are generally subsiding. However, as 
other issues arise and take center stage, policy makers and elected officials 
cannot allow the federal government’s preparedness and response 
capabilities to fall back to pre-2001 levels. 
V. CONCLUSION 
Federal response capabilities are vital in responding to a bioterrorism 
attack that will not be confined within traditional state boundaries. The 
Public Health Security and Bioterrorism Preparedness and Response Act 
of 2002 helped strengthen and remedy problems borne out by the anthrax 
attacks of 2001. However, the Act did not initiate a new consolidated 
 181. Project BioShield Act of 2004, Pub. L. No. 108-276, 118 Stat. 835 (2004). 
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federal approach, and improvements in coordination and planning are 
needed to respond to future threats. 
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